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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction of this matter is conferred by Section
78-2(a}-3(2)(i), U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the lower court err in its determination that

approximately $148,000 of promissory notes executed by the
defendant to various third parties constituted marital property
subject to division even though the funds for such loans came
from an account the court determined to be separate and even
though all of the notes were executed after the parties had been
legally divorced?

The appellate standard of review for this

issue is whether the lower court's Findings of Fact are contrary
to the clear preponderance of the evidence or that the trial
court has abused its discretion in making the award.

An

appellate court will disturb a trial court's findings if the

appellate court reaches the definite and firm conviction that
mistakes have been made,
1990)•

Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App.

It is incumbent upon a trial court to first divide

separate property from marital property before making any
division of assets.

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App.

1990); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App.
2.

1990).

Did the lower court err in failing to allow the full

value of a debt Defendant incurred in his business operation to
be deducted from the division of marital assets?

Specifically,

did the court err in concluding in its Findings that Defendant
was indebted to his mother for only $270,000 rather than
$410,000 as shown by the undisputed evidence.

The standard of

appellate review for this issue is whether the lower court's
Findings of Fact are contrary to the clear preponderance of the
evidence or that the trial court has abused its discretion in
making the award.

An appellate court will disturb a trial

court's findings if the appellate court reaches the definite and
firm conviction that mistakes have been made.

Berger v. Berber,

713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah
App.

1990); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App.

1988).
3.

Did the lower court err in finding that $57,000 would

be included as an asset of Defendant in the marital division
even though the court acknowledged that such award was
completely arbitrary and was not based upon any evidence as to
the actual amount that Defendant received in a real estate
transaction.

The appellate standard of review for this issue is
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whether the lower court's Findings of Fact are contrary to the
clear preponderance of the evidence or that the trial court has
abused its discretion in making the award.

An appellate court

will disturb a trial court's findings if the appellate court
reaches the definite and firm conviction that mistakes have been
made.

Dunn v. Dunnf 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App.
4.

1990).

Does the Decree of Divorce fail to properly credit

Defendant for $4,300 awarded by the Court to Defendant as value
for a boat which Plaintiff converted from the marital assets?
The appellate standard of review for this issue is whether the
lower court's Findings of Fact are contrary to the clear
preponderance of the evidence or that the trial court has abused
its discretion in making the award.

An appellate court will

disturb a trial court's findings if the appellate court reaches
the definite and firm conviction that mistakes have been made.
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App.

1990).

APPLICABLE STATUTES
Section 30-3-5, U.C.A.

Disposition of Property.

1. When a Decree of Divorce is entered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, debts or obligations and
parties.
* * *

3. The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Supplemental Judgment of Divorce

entered by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson.

The sole issue of

this appeal is whether the lower court erred in making its award
of property to the respective parties,
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
In December of 1990, Plaintiff filed her Complaint for
Divorce,

(R. 6 ) . On February 26, 1991 a Decree of Divorce was

entered as to the marriage of the parties.

All remaining issues

were reserved for further consideration by the court.

(R.

82-85).
A trial was held before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on
June 4, 11, 12, 15 and 16 of 1992.

Judge Wilkinson ruled from

the bench as to the various matters being contested by the
parties.

(R. 484-517).

Subsequently, on August 4, 1992 the Court signed and
executed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Supplemental Decree of Divorce prepared by Plaintiff's
counsel.

(R.

362-94; 395-403).

On September 1, 1992 Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal.
(R. 429). On September 14, 1992 Plaintiff filed a Notice of
Cross Appeal.

(R. 430).

On November 4, 1992 this Court on its own motion
consolidated the two appeals into Case No. 920588-CA.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The litigation in the lower court was extensive and
required approximately five days of trial.

Numerous issues

concerning the custody and visitation of children, alimony,
distribution of assets, and requests for contempt, were
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litigated below.

The complexity of this divorce proceeding is

best illustrated by the over thirty-page Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which were required to be entered as to the
numerous issues being litigated.
Fortunately, however, for purposes of Defendant's appeal
only several issues of controversy now remain.

All of these

areas focus upon the award of property and assets by the lower
court.

While Defendant does not necessarily agree with the

Court's decision concerning other matters, Defendant realizes
that the lower court is vested with a large amount of discretion
and that such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in most
instances.

On the other hand, those matters which are now being

raised on this appeal by Defendant concern errors of property
division where mistakes or inconsistency have occurred.

With

this in mind, therefore, the Statement of Facts will be utilized
only to give this Court a thumbnail sketch of the present
controversy on appeal.

The actual "marshalling of the evidence"

will be deferred to the individual sections of argument
contained infra in this brief.
836, 838 (Utah App.

See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d

1991).

The parties were married on August 26, 1978 in Virginia.
During the course of the marriage the parties had three
children, two boys and a girl, ranging in present age from 13 to
7.

During the marriage Plaintiff maintained the household and

the children while Defendant participated in various business
ventures including real estate sales and development.

The

income made by the defendant from these ventures paid a large

portion of the family expenses each year.
In addition, however, Defendant had inherited a substantial
amount of blue chip stock from his grandparents.

A plan going

back several generations had been devised for tax purposes
whereas the family inheritance would be passed on by skipping
one generation.

Thus, Defendant received his inheritance from

his grandparents whereas Defendant's children were to receive
their inheritance from Defendant's parents.
Prior to the inception of the marriage Defendant maintained
an account at Kidder-Peabody in which the inherited stock was
placed.

The value of the stock appreciated on its own through

the years of the marriage.

In addition, in 1986 over $260,000

of stock was placed into the Kidder-Peabody account when a
personal holding company opened by Defendant's grandfather
required liquidation.

It was undisputed that all of this stock

and the account itself was solely in the name of the defendant
Peter Coats.
During the course of the marriage Defendant utilized this
account in several ways.

On some occasions he would directly

draw money out of the account specifically for family expenses
such as homes, cars, and other necessities.

He frequently used

the dividend income from the account to supplement the extensive
lifestyle enjoyed by the parties.

He also frequently margined

the account so that he could borrow funds for his real estate
ventures.
After the marriage had been officially terminated by the
lower court, Defendant found that he could significantly

increase his real estate commissions if he would lend home
owners amounts of money to allow them to purchase new
homes pending the sale of their old home.

Accordingly, after

the divorce was finalized he lent approximately $148,000 drawn
from the Kidder-Peabody margin account to a number of third
parties and received trust notes in return.

A more complete

discussion concerning the Kidder-Peabody account will be made
during the Argument portion of this brief.
During the course of the marriage the parties acquired
numerous assets in the form of real estate, personal property,
and receivables.

At the same time, however, numerous

liabilities were also incurred in the form of loans, mortgages,
and credit consumption.

In order for the defendant, for

example, to develop the Brandon Canyon properties, it was
necessary for him to borrow approximately $400,000 from his
mother, Isabel Coats.

A complete discussion as to this

transaction and the ruling of the lower court will also be
contained infra in the Argument portion of this brief.
The Brandon Canyon development was principally undertaken
by the defendant because he was unable to sell several of the
lots which he had purchased.

A great deal of testimony was

heard by the lower court concerning the profitability of this
development.

The ruling of the lower court in its ultimate

evaluation of this property as an asset will also be discussed
in the Argument portion of this brief.
At the conclusion of the trial the lower court made
numerous awards and divisions.

Essentially, the custody of the

children was given to the plaintiff subject to specific
visitation rights of the defendant.

The valuation of child

support and alimony was dependent upon the determination as to
the defendant's annual income.

Because of the complexities of

the business income as well as the use of assets in order to
maintain high lifestyle (which all parties agreed was beyond
their means), a heated controversy was present during the trial
as to this income determination.

The defendant maintained his

actual average income would be in the $60,000 to $70,000 range,
whereas the plaintiff maintained that the income level was well
over $130,000.

The lower court adopted the majority of

Plaintiff's position and ruled that Defendant would be charged
with an annual income of $120,000 for purposes of determining
child support and alimony.

Accordingly, the Court ordered

Defendant to pay approximately $2,000 per month as child support
and $2,000 a month as alimony for a ten-year period.
The Court was still faced with the monumental task of
dividing the assets and liabilities of the parties.

The Court

determined, for example, that the Kidder-Peabody account would
be considered to be the sole property of the defendant.

On the

other hand, specific draws of principle which had been used for
family purposes such as houses and cars were deemed to be
marital assets.

The Court evaluated numerous items of personal

property, real estate, and other assets and obligations and
concluded that the defendant owed Plaintiff approximately
$144,000 in order to equalize a division of the marital estate.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The issue as to the status of the Kidder-Peabody

account was highly controversial.

Plaintiff attempted to show

that this account was part of the marital assets even though it
had been funded entirely from inheritance solely in the name of
the defendant.

Defendant, on the other hand, claimed that this

account was solely his except for those assets where he had
removed money from the account and converted them into clearly
marital assets.

The lower court found in favor of the defendant

and ruled that the Kidder-Peabody account should not be
considered part of the marital estate.

At the same time,

however, the court ruled that approximately $1485,000 worth of
notes were a marital asset to be charged against the account of
the defendant.

These notes were all executed after the parties

had been divorced, were made by the defendant for business
purposes to generate commission income, were all taken from the
Kidder-Peabody account, and all notes required payment directly
back into such account.

Thus, had Defendant allowed this money

to stay in the Kidder-Peabody account it would not have been
charged as a marital asset against him.

The wrongful inclusion

of these notes resulted to Defendant's detriment of some $58,000
in the marital balancing equities.
2.

The lower court recognized that Defendant was forced to

borrow money from his mother in order to have sufficient funds
to develop Brandon Canyon.

This development was considered a

marital asset by the Court and Defendant was credited with its
value.

The lower court, however, while recognizing a legitimate

debt existed to Defendant's mother, awarded him only a liability
of $270,000 even though the undisputed evidence shows that the
principal balance actually owing as of the time of the
accounting cutoff was approximately $400,000 with another
$10,000 in accrued interest.

The lower court declined to

recognize this increased amount on the erroneous assumption that
a contradiction of testimony had occurred between Defendant's
mother and Defendant's accountants when no such contradiction in
fact existed.
3,

One of the other contested items of the trial was the

value of the Brandon Canyon development.

Defendant basically

claimed that the development was a severe loss and that if
anything he had lost money because of it.

Plaintiff, on the

other hand, claimed that the development was a success and that
Defendant should be credited with the development as an asset.
Ultimately, Defendant (assuming that he would be able to claim
the liabilities on Brandon Canyon) testified that its asset
value would be approximately $320,000.

The Court adopted

Defendant's evaluation of Brandon Canyon.

However, the court

also awarded an addition $57,300 against the defendant as an
arbitrary figure amounting to one-third of the value of the Lot
16 home which had been sold between the time of the last
accounting and the time of the court decision.

This decision

admitted by the court to be arbitrary failed to allow Defendant
to show any additional liability that was incurred during this
same time period in order to complete the construction of the
house.

Thus, the decision of the court as to this additional
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$57,300 was not based upon any reliable evidence in the record
and must either be vacated or remanded for a correct valuation
to be made.
4.

After extensive testimony concerning the value of a

jointly-owned boat, the lower court concluded that the boat had
a value of $4,300 which should be attributed to the plaintiff as
an asset since she obtained the funds from the boat when she
sold it during the marriage.

In spite of the Court's finding

and order, the plaintiff was never assessed with this $4,300
asset and therefore the overall award seeking to equalize the
marital estate is an error.
ARGUMENT
The defendant in this action recognizes the standard of
appellate review which is applicabe to appeals involving divorce
decrees.

This Court in Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App.

1990) summarized the various standards of review as follows:
In a divorce proceeding, "determining and
assigning values to marital property is a matter for
the trial court and this Court will not disturb those
determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of
discretion. To permit appellate review of the
property distribution, the distribution must be based
upon adequate factual findings and must be in
accordance with the standards set by this state's
appellate courts. We will not disturb a trial
court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous,
that is, against the clear weight of evidence, or
unless we reach a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id. at 1317. (Citations
omitted).
As noted earlier, the issues in this divorce were hotly
contested by both parties.

A review of the trial testimony and

the exhibits reveal numerous instances of dispute and
disagreement.

Both parties extensively utilized accountants in

attempting to persuade the court that their method of evaluation
was correct.

Numerous experts testified for both sides as to

the value of property, assets, or even liabilities.

Defendant

readily admits that this was not an easy case for either the
attorneys, the parties, or the court.
Because the lower court necessarily had to exercise its
discretion in many instances, both parties were necessarily
unhappy about some rulings, and pleased with others.

For

example, Plaintiff won a complete victory in the determination
by the lower court of Defendant's average income in setting the
amount of child support and alimony.

On the other hand,

Defendant won several victories in the valuation of personal
property and in the court's denial of certain obligations that
Plaintiff was seeking Defendant to pay.
Defendant believes that this appeal, therefore, does not
center upon matters of discretion in which the court had
latitude to decide in either direction.

Instead, this appeal

focuses upon the methods utilized by the court in making its
awards after the discretionary decisions had already been made.
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT APPROXIMATELY $148,000 IN TRUST
DEED NOTES WERE PART OF THE MARITAL
ESTATE SUBJECT TO DIVISION WHEN SUCH
NOTES CAME FROM NON-MARITAL FUNDS OF THE
KIDDER-PEABODY ACCOUNT, WERE ALL ISSUED
AFTER THE PARTIES WERE DIVORCED, AND WERE
ALL PAYABLE BACK INTO THE KIDDERPEABODY FUND.
As noted earlier in this brief, the status of Defendant's
Kidder-Peabody account was a highly disputed issue.

It was

undisputed, however, that this account existed prior to the
marriage, that it was listed solely in Defendant's own name, and
that all of the stock funding such account had been obtained
through inheritance from Defendant's grandparents.

For example,

Plaintiff testified as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Larew): Peter received gifts from his parents
and grandparents during your marriage; is that
right?
A. We all did.
Q. Was any stock put in your name from Peter's parents?
A. No.
Q. Was stock put in Peter's name from his parents?
A. Yes.
Q. What about from his grandparents?
in Peter's name?

Did they put stock

A. I apologize. This stock came from Peter's
grandparents, not his parents.
Q. Which stock are you referring to?
stock Peter received?

Is that all the

A. That's how their family has it set up, yes.
Q. All stock that Peter got during your marriage was
from Peter's grandparents?
A. Generally, yes.

(Tr. 805).

Extensive testimony was offered as to those matters which
were contested.

For example, Plaintiff's accountant testified

that the Kidder-Peabody account was used on a daily basis by the
defendant and could not be considered a separate asset of the
defendant.

(Tr. 560-63; 1547-49).

Plaintiff testified that

Defendant always represented during the marriage that the money
from the Kidder-Peabody accounts always belonged to both of
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them.

(Tr. 759-62).
On the other hand, Defendant testified that this account

was solely his property obtained from his grandparents and that
his wife never had access to either the underlying stock or to
the account itself.

(Tr. 906-11).

Defendant acknowledged that

whenever he utilized assets from the account for non-business
expenses that that money then became a marital asset.

He

recognized, for example, that $30,000 from the account was used
for the purchase of a home in Colorado, $58,000 for the purchase
of the Pepperwood home as well as additional amounts to buy
automobiles and other family purposes.

(Tr. 854-56).

The question of whether the Kidder-Peabody account would be
considered marital property or separate property required
Plaintiff to submit proposals based upon both alternatives.

For

example, Exhibit 90 is a proposed marital asset division
including the asset of $411,000 for the Kidder-Peabody
securities as well as a liability of $228,000 owing to the
Kidder-Peabody margin account.

Exhibit 91 was prepared by

Plaintiff to show the "Marital Asset Division Without
Kidder-Peabody." See also Plaintiff's Exhibits 97 and 98 for
a similar treatment of assets and liabilities.
In making its decision, the lower court attempted to follow
the directions of this Court when this Court stated:
[T]he Court should first properly categorize the
parties1 property as part of the marital estate or as
the separate property of one or the other. Each
party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her
separate property and 50 percent of the marital
property. Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1172
(Utah App. 1990); Dunn v. Dunnr 802 P.2d 1314,
1323 (Utah App. 1990).
-14-

The Court ruled that the Kidder-Peabody account could not
be considered marital property.

In the bench ruling the Court

stated:
Now the Court recognizes that there is the
Kidder-Peabody stock which the defendant—the
defendant drew on during their marriage. It may have
been part—I'm sure it was part of it—and the Court
does find, however, that the corpus of that stock is
the defendant's, and would remain with the defendant,
and the liabilities attached to is, and that the
plaintiff would have no right on that; but that was
certainly used throughout the marriage, the Court
would find, as far as generating income, as far as
what the defendant used with his time to promote the
various subdivisions or sale of real estate which he
did generate. (Tr. 509).
In addition, the Court chose to base its award upon Plaintiff's
Exhibit 91 which was the marital assets division proposed by the
plaintiff "without Kidder-Peabody".

(Tr. 494).

The decision of the lower court is fully supportable based
upon the fact that the Kidder-Peabody account was both
premarital property and was funded entirely by inheritance
directly to the defendant.

See Mortensen v. Mortensen,

760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314
(Utah App.

1990); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App.

1990); Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah App.
1990) .
Thus, under the Court's ruling any stock or other asset
maintained in the Kidder-Peabody account at the time the divorce
was final in February of 1991 would properly be considered the
separate property of the defendant.

Plaintiff may not agree

with the ruling of the Court but can certainly not disagree with
its elementary concept.

The problem facing this Court on appeal is simply that the
lower court, while recognizing that the Kidder-Peabody account
was separate property, failed to afford the same status to other
assets which were converted from the Kidder-Peabody account.

As

a result of this error approximately $148,000 of receivable
notes were included in the marital division with Defendant being
charged with possession of the assets.
During the last portion of the marriage Defendant utilized
the Kidder-Peabody account for the purpose of making what he
termed as "bridge loans".

For example, if a client had found a

home that they wished to purchase but could not purchase a new
home until they sold their old home, then Defendant would
utilize the bridge loan concept.

He would take a trust deed

note on the old home for the amount of equity existing thereby
enabling the client to purchase the new home.
sold, he would then be repaid immediately.

When the old home

This method of using

the margin ability of the Kidder-Peabody account allowed him to
often make two commissions from the purchase of the new home and
the sale of the old home.

(Tr. 914-15).

During the marriage,

while most of the money was returned to the Kidder-Peabody
account after the sales had occurred, some of it would be
utilized for family expenses.

In that instance, the money which

did not go back into the Kidder-Peabody account clearly became a
marital asset which was later considered by the lower court in
the overall division of assets.
After the parties were legally divorced, Defendant
continued to use the bridge loan system in order to generate
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business for his real estate brokerage.

Contained in the

Appendix of this Brief is an exhibit entitled "Peter Coats
Post-Divorce Notes Receivable." This exhibit is a summary of
Defendant's Exhibit 78 which was admitted by the lower court.
Defendant's Exhibit 78 consisted of the original note as well as
supporting documents from the Kidder-Peabody account and the
closing of the various real estate transactions.

The attached

exhibit herein shows that approximately $148,000 was loaned,
after the divorce was final, from the Kidder-Peabody account
directly to third parties to facilitate the real estate
transactions.

Attached to this exhibit are the trust deed notes

which were contained in Exhibit 78 and which show that each note
is made payable specifically to the "Peter Coats Kidder
Account."
The lower court refused to eliminate these notes
receivables as part of the marital estate and instead decided to
discount them 20% because of their collectibility difficulties.
(Tr.

502, Findings of Fact, pp.

16-17).

As such, therefore,

the Court utilized these ten post-divorce notes in computing the
assets and liabilities of the parties.

See Exhibit C of the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R.

393-94.

The effect

of the inclusion of these post-divorce notes from the
Kidder-Peabody account was to increase the marital assets
effectively by $116,192 after the 20% discount was calculated.
Because Defendant was given credit for having these assets, he
was effectively penalized $58,964 for having converted the stock
margin into notes receivable.

This Court in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App.

1990)

dealt with the contention that once the form of inherited
property has been changed it loses its separate property status.
This Court stated:
Even though defendant's inheritance is readily
traceable and has not been co-mingled, plaintiff
argues that defendant's inherited funds have
substantially changed in form—they were received as
cash but have become stocks, bonds and real estate-therefore they should be considered part of the
marital estate.
Plaintiff relies on Mortensen, wherein the Court
stated that property which had lost its "identity
through co-mingling or exchanges" could properly be
considered part of the marital estate. 760 P.2d at
308.
We disagree with Plaintiff's reading of
Mortensen. The thrust of Mortensen is not
whether the mere form of property is changed, but
whether it has lost its "identity" as separate
property. Id. The separate character of the
defendant's inheritance has been maintained in
segregated accounts and portfolios and the home she
purchased. Conversion from one investment medium to
another does not, by itself, destroy the integrity of
segregation.
To accept Plaintiff's view of Mortensen would
unreasonably discourage the prudent investment of
inherited funds. In order to preserve the property's
separate character, the donee or heir would be
required to maintain the property in the same
physical form in which it was received, be it
securities, real estate, or cash. The law does not
require such economic absurdity. Id. at 1169.
(Emphasis added).
In summary, tho decision of the lower court is inconsistent
and cannot be sustained.

Since the lower court clearly found

the Kidder-Peabody account to be the separate property of the
defendant it was incumbent upon the lower court to also find the
trust deed notes specifically derived from that account and
specifically payable back to that account to be Defendant's
-1 a-

separate property.

To have included these notes in the marital

estate allowed the plaintiff to receive credit for one-half of
their value.

Such result cannot be sustained.

This Court,

therefore, should remand this matter and require the lower court
to make the mathematical correction of the equities necessary to
correct this error.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE FULL AMOUNT OF DEBT
THAT DEFENDANT OWED TO HIS MOTHER
ISABEL COATS.
Defendant maintained that in order to develop the Brandon
Canyon properties, it was necessary for him to borrow some
$400,000 from his mother, Isabel Coats.

Plaintiff, on the other

hand, took the position that there was no debt owed by Defendant
and that the entire transaction was manufactured after the
divorce proceeding began.

As an example, during the cross

examinaton of Isabel Coats by Plaintifffs attorney, the
following accusations were made:
Q. (By Mr. Peterson): Isn't it true, I want to ask this
question to you in a straight-forward fashion, isn't
it true that this note was manufactured by Peter
Coats after the commencement of these proceedings and
sent to you at a date long after Kathryn Coats
commenced these proceedings for divorce?
A. No.
Q. So you received then that note in its original form
on a date sometime in early 1990?
A. Yes.
* * *

Q. I'm going to ask you the question one more time.
This note in fact was manufactured by Peter and sent
to you long after these divorce proceedings began,

wasn't it?
A. No.
Q. Didn't Peter indicate to you that as a result of the
pretrial in front of the court, and the assertion
that there was no evidence documenting the $400,000
in liability to you, that you would have to have a
note, and he sent you this note?
A. No.

(Tr. 988-90) .

Throughout the first few days of the trial Plaintiff
refused to recognize any debt owing to Isabel Coats.
example, Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 8, 13, and 31.

See, for

On the other

hand, even Plaintiff's accountant acknowledged that he was aware
of Defendant's $400,000 claim concerning the note to Peter's
mother and acknowledged that if there was such a valid note then
Defendant should be given a liability deduction on his side of
the accounting.

(Tr.

624).

In addition, Plaintiff's witness,

David Evans, testified that he also had learned of the lien of
Mrs. Coats for $400,000 and in fact a property search owned by
Peter Coats revealed a $400,000 trust deed note.

(Tr.

1084;

Exhibit 57).
Defendant's mother Isabel Coats testified that Exhibit 50
was an original note dated January 26, 1990 which allowed her
son to borrow up to $400,000 for his development business.

She

emphatically stated that the promissory note was a bona fide
loan upon which she expected payment.

She maintained that she

obtained money for these loans by borrowing on her own KidderPeabody margin account.

(Tr. 980-87) .

Because of the claims asserted by Plaintiff and her
attorney at trial, the entire testimony of Isabel Coats is

included in the appendix to this brief.

Contrary to the

assertions of the plaintiff, Mrs- Coats at no time stated the
exact amount that was owing on the note.

Instead, she testified

as to the validity of the note and as to the method by which the
funds were obtained from her brokerage house.

There is nothing

in the testimony to state that Exhibit 50 and its accompanying
letters of authorization constituted the entire amount of the
draws.

(Tr.

974-1000).

Defendant's balance sheets prepared prior to Isabel's
testimony consistently recognized a debt of $401,000 to Isabel
Coats together with accrued interest of $10,025.

(Defendant's

Exhibits 58 and 59). Apparently, after listening to the
testimony of Isabel Coats, Plaintiff and her attorney decided to
abandon the claim that no valid debt existed.

Instead,

Plaintiff now asserted in various exhibits that the actual debt
owing was $270,000 which was the total of the written
authorizations attached to the promissory note contained in
Defendant's Exhibit 50.

See Plaintiff's Exhibits 65, 90, 91, 97

and 98.
Defendant, as the debtor, testified concerning the
existence of the note contained in Exhibit 50.

Defendant

clearly testified that he did not know the amount owing to his
mother and relied entirely upon his accountants for that
information.

(Tr.

1056-57).

Subsequently, Melody J. Rasmussen, a CPA assisting
Defendant in his case, testified as to the loan between Peter
and his mother.

Plaintiff's attorney strenuously objected on

the grounds that such testimony would contradict the direct
testimony of Mrs. Coats and also directly contradict Exhibit 50
containing the note and various letters written concerning the
note.
The Court overruled these objections and held that Ms.
Rasmussenfs testimony was relevant and also allowed the
introduction of Exhibit 72 into evidence.

This exhibit

contained numerous letters and accountings from Mrs. Coats
together with an accounting of the various draws made by Peter.
In addition, copies of checks which Peter claimed to be interest
payments on the loans were contained in Exhibit 72.
Ms.

Rasmussen testified that as of April 30, 1992, there

was $401,000 owing on the note and $10,025 of accrued interest
owing.

(Tr.

1379).

Because of the nature of this issue, the

entire testimony of Melody Rasmussen is also included in the
Appendix to this Brief together with a copy of Exhibit 72.

(Tr.

1374-90).
In closing argument Plaintiff's attorney contended that the
testimony of Ms. Rasmussen and the accompanying exhibits were in
direct contradiction to the testimony of Mrs. Coats who he
claimed stated that the entire amount of the loan was $270,000
as represented by Exhibit 50.

(Tr.

1244-46).

Of course, at

this time neither Plaintiff's counsel nor the Court had the
benefit of a transcript of Mrs. Coats' exact testimony.
During the closing argument of Defendant's counsel, the
Court was concerned about the accusations made by Plaintiff's
counsel as to the contradiction of testimony.

The following

dialogue occurred:
MR. LAREW: The liabilities for Isabel Coats I think
counsel misrepresents- On her testimony, she didn't
testify those letters constituted the entire record
of her loans to Mr, Coats. These were merely
representative. Those did represent her request to
her brother. She never said they were all of them
and that there weren't any others.
THE COURT: Why didn't she testify further, then, as
to what they were? Why didn't she give further
testimony, then, as to—you say she didn't testify
that was all of it: why didn't she give testimony as
to what they all were?
MR. LAREW: Frankly, we didn't think to ask if those
were representative. She testified some time she
would call on the telephone and they would be doing
that. There was no paper transaction.
THE COURT: And I recall she was going to leave town,
and somebody made a request to get her in so she
could get on out, and it seems like to me her
testimony would be quite important to that issue.
MR. LAREW: Frankly, Your Honor, we thought that
sufficed. We had the promissory notes. She
testified it was $400,000, up to $400,000. We have
her computation, her handwritten computation showing
that that went t o — a t one point it was $399,996,
something like that, in a couple of places.
Additionally, Your Honor, we got introduced into
evidence Mr. Coats' payments to her of interest, and
if those payments of interest are computed, it
computes out to what we have said it is. That
did—in fact he did owe her the amount of $400,000 as
of the time when it indicates he owed that much, and
the interest was paid.
We've got that testimony backward and forward,
and frankly I didn't know we would have to hammer it
with every single one, because she didn't have the
paper transaction for every single one. Our purpose
was to establish that the loan had been made, and
then with other documents establish what it had
gotten up to. And I think we have done that, at
least by implication. We have got secondary support
for all of our allegations that we made regarding
that bona fide note, bona fide obligation.
She testified that she never gives stock for a
loan, doesn't give cash or gifts in large amounts, it
just came out that she borrowed against her own stock

in order to provide cash for Mr. Coats to do this,
gave him cash and expected to be repaid cash.
* * *

I think that is good evidence. There was in
fact a note owed and interest was paid. It was
identified as a note. It wasn't something generated
after the fact, his interest payments go back for
more than a year. (Tr. 1278-81).
The lower court adopted the position of Plaintiff's
attorney and completely discounted the testimony of the
accountant and the accompanying documents.

The Court stated:

Isabel Coats—of course there's been a lot said
of this. The Court has to determine what is most
believable, what was the best testimony, and I
question counsel on what the CPA yesterday testified
to as far as the accounting, and the court is not
persuaded that she—and I'm not stating—well, I
believe she is stating it truthfully for the
information that she had, and the Court is not making
any accusations as far as any information being
generated, except that the Court cannot reconcile in
its mind if there was an obligation of $411,025 that
when the mother was here and on the stand, that that
would not have been brought out, especially when they
said she had to leave and they wanted to get her on.
So what I'm saying is I'm adopting $270,000 as the
note due Isabel Coats. (Tr. 499-500).
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is an even
stronger statement as to the reason the lower court refused to
recognize the increased liability.

Finding No. 14(k)(2) states

the following:
The Court finds the liability owed to Isabel
Coats to be $270,000. There was conflicting evidence
presented to the Court as to the amount of liability
owed to Isabel Coats. Isabel Coats testified to the
Court and stated that Defendant's Exhibit D-50 showed
all of the obligations owed by the defendant to her.
The total amount of the notes which make up
Defendant's Exhibit D-50 is $270,000. While the
defendant's certified public accountant testified on
the amount of the notes and stated that the
outstanding balance was $411,025, that amount was
never verified by Isabel Coats, and the Court cannot

reconcile in its mind the difference between the
amount testified to by the certified public
accountant and the amount testified to by Defendant's
mother, who is the creditor on the note.
The Court finds that the most credible evidence
is that of the creditor and that if she were owed
more than $270,000, that testimony certainly would
have been presented to the Court, That is especially
true in the mind of the Court when the defendant
placed Isabel Coats on the stand out of time to be
able to get her testimony in regarding the liability
and the amount owed to her by the defendant.
Accordingly, the Court specifically finds that the
preponderance of the evidence is that the outstanding
note owed to Isabel Coats is in the amount of
$270,000. (Findings of Fact, pp. 17-18).
(Emphasis
added).
It is apparent that the lower court rejected Defendant's
claim of $411,000 on the assumption that the testmony of Mrs.
Coats directly contradicted the testimony of the accountant.

As

noted earlier, however, a review of the transcript of Mrs.
Coats' testimony shows no such contradiction.

Mrs. Coats never

stated the amount that was owing to her and never stated that all
of the letters attached to the promissory note contained in
Exhibit 50 were the entire sum due and owing to her by her son.
It is clear from reading the transcript that Mrs. Coats did not
state any figure whatsoever except as to the $400,000 note
itself.

Thus, the specific finding by the lower court of the

contradiction in testimony is clearly erroneous.
In addition, Defendant as the debtor was entitled to
present evidence as to what he claimed was owing to his mother.
Independent of her testimony he also relied upon the accountants
to verify his claim.

For this reason, therefore, the testimony

of Ms. Rasmussen not only supplemented that of Isabel Coats as
the creditor but also constituted the testimony of Defendant as

the debtor.
Again, this issue is similar to the previous one.

The

lower court obviously had a great deal of discretion in deciding
whether to believe that a valid debt existed or did not exist.
Had the Court ruled against such a debt it is unlikely that this
Court would ever disturb the lower court's discretionary
decision based upon the conflicting testimony of the witnesses.
However, once the lower court made a decision as to which way it
would proceed, it was incumbent upon the Court to find the
correct amount owing under the Isabel Coats note.

The Court

incorrectly assumed that there was conflicting testimony
presented in the case and that the Court had to decide which
version of the amount it was to believe.

It is clear, however,

that no such contradiction existed and the Court erred in
concluding that it was required to make such a decision.
In reality, Defendant's evidence is consistent that a note
was executed by Defendant to his mother for up to $400,000, that
various draws were made by his mother from her Kidder-Peabody
account throughout the two year period in order to finance
Defendant's building projects, and that the interest payments
made by the defendant as evidenced by checks in the record are
completely consistent with the amounts claimed to be owing both
by the accountant and by the letters of Defendant's mother
contained in Exhibit 72.
For these reasons, therefore, the Court erred in awarding
only a $270,000 debt to the defendant and this Court should
remand for correction to the proper amount in order to equalize

the accounting of the marital estate.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY
CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH A MARITAL ASSET
VALUE OF $57,300 FOR THE BRANDON CANYON
DEVELOPMENT WHEN SUCH FINDING WAS NOT
BASED UPON ANY EVIDENCE.
It is undisputed that during the course of the marriage
Defendant undertook a real estate development project known as
Brandon Canyon.

This project came about after defendant had

been persuaded to purchase land in this subdivision area for the
purpose of resale and development.

Because of the terrain and

other economic factors, he was unable to sell several of these
construction lots.

In conjunction with others, therefore, he

began a project where he would finance and sell the completed
houses once they had been constructed.

(Tr.

1055-58).

As with almost every asset and liability at issue in this
divorce action, the parties had diverse views as to the success
or failure of the Brandon Canyon development.

Plaintiff

attempted to prove through various expert witnesses that the
Brandon Canyon property development was a successful financial
venture and severely disagreed with the costs of development
claimed by Defendant.

On the other hand, Defendant and his

witnesses maintained that because of extreme difficulty in the
terrain of the development, costs were much higher than
anticipated and that very little profit would ever be made.
Defendant principally obtained financing for the Brandon
Canyon project from his mother, Isabel Coats, in an amount that
he claimed to be approximately $400,000 but which Plaintiff

claimed to be $270,000.

This initial money funded the project

to the completion of some houses but was insufficient to
complete others.

It was therefore necessary to obtain

additional money from other sources or to wait until the sale of
some of the properties before others could be completed.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 91 computed the Brandon Canyon assets
to be approximately $560,000 based upon the projected sales
price of lots 15, 16 and 17 together with a trust deed note on
lot 28 and the value of an undeveloped lot, no.

4.

As to the

liability aspect of the Brandon Canyon development, Plaintiff
recognized only $270,000 as the Isabel Coats promissory note
thereby showing an assert over liability value of $290,000.
Defendant strongly contested this evaluation.

He argued

that the amount shown as assets in Plaintiff's Exhibit 91
represented completed houses.

In fact, however, the houses were

not complete and would require additional funding before they
could in fact be sold for the prices projected by the plaintiff.
For this reason, Defendant attempted to value the properties as
of April 30, 1992 so that both the asset value and the liability
value could be computed at the same time.
Defendant offered Exhibit 99 which was entitled "Brandon
Canyon Detail April 30, 1992." This exhibit showed that the
combined asset value of Lots 4, 15, 16, 17, 23, and 28 was
$319,117 based upon the actual money that had been expended as
to each lot.
Shortly before trial the house on Lot 16 was sold for
$171,900.

Exhibit 99 valued lot 16 at $105,517 as of April 30,

1992.

As of that date, however, the house was certainly not in

a sellable condition and it required Defendant to expend an
additional amount of money during the next five-week period in
order to complete and finish the home.

Neither the plaintiff

(Tr. 1574, 1583) nor the defendant (Tr. 1595-97) were aware of
what the actual construction costs were to complete the Lot 16
house.
Thus, at the close of the case the positions of the parties
were as follows: Plaintiff maintained that the asset value of
Brandon Canyon was the projected sale of all the lots totaling
$591,000 with a recognized liability to Isabel Coats of
$270,000.

Plaintiff acknowledged that all the the houses were

not in fact sold or complete and that additional construction
costs of an unknown amount would be required before sale could
be completed.
Defendant, on the other hand, evaluated the asset of
Brandon Canyon at $319,000 as of April 30, 1992 with a
recognized liability of $410,000 owing to Isabel Coats.

Since

Lot 16 was already evaluated at that date, Defendant took the
position that any subsequent sale was immaterial since it would
require a concurrent adjustment of liabilities as well.
The Court adopted the value of Brandon Canyon proposed by
the defendant but, in addition, added an additional $57,000 of
value based upon the sale of Lot 16.

The Court stated in the

bench ruling:
Brandon Canyon has been somewhat of a headache
to the Court. I guess I have to indicate to you that
I'm still not thoroughly convinced as to what is
taking place as far as Brandon Canyon assets are

concerned.
this.

I'm going to talk for a few minutes on

The Court, from the exhibits and testimony, was
somewhat persuaded that $319,117 is probably the
value of Brandon Canyon, except for the fact of the
defendant taking the stand and testifying as to the
value of certain lots, and particularly saying that
Lot 16 has already been sold for $171,900.
If Brandon Canyon has a value of $319,000 and as
they develop more and finish it and put more money
into it, and sell homes, they would start to get
money out of it. And that's fine. The Court would
take that.
But why does Lot 16, which has been sold, really
now is out of Brandon Canyon, and I have no basis for
taking that lot out and subtracting a value from the
$319,000.
So what I'm saying is that the evidence is still
conflicting to this Court as far as what is taking
place. I shouldn't say—well, "taking place" or what
the value of Brandon Canyon really is.
And I don't know that I can sit here and hear
testimony from the defendant and from the accountants
on Brandon Canyon and from each party that comes and
still come back with the amounts which they had.
So the Court is going to do this; and I'll
admit this is an arbitrary situation. The Court is
going to place a value on Brandon Canyon of $319,117
plus one-third of $171,900 or the value that Lot 16
sold for. And that's the way the Court is going to
treat that in there. (Tr. 498-99).
(Emphasis
added). See also Finding of Fact 14(i)(2).
The Court clearly acknowledged that the decision to add the
additional $57,000 was arbitrary.

Again, Defendant recognizes

that this case provided many difficult decisions in valuation of
assets and does not blame the court for attempting to reach a
fair valuation.

However, there is simply no evidentiary support

for the method utilized by the lower court and therefore
Defendant cannot be legally charged with an additional $57,000
in marital assets based upon the existing record.

As noted earlier, Defendant recognized that the value of
Lot 16 was $105,517-

This amount was computed in the total

$319,000 figure used by the Court.

It is undisputed that the

property was in fact sold for $172,000.

The decision of the

Court, however, fails to recognize the unknown liabilities
incurred in order to complete Lot 16.

There is simply no

evidence in the record as to what additional money was required
in order to bring a property which had $105,000 in costs
invested in it as of April 30, 1992 to a market value of
$172,000 in June of 1992.
The present decision concludes that Defendant essentially
made $57,000 from the sale of Lot 16.

This "profit" was then

utilized by the Court as a marital asset in computing what
equities existed between the parties.

As a practical matter,

therefore, Plaintiff received almost $30,000 in an adjusted
judgment because of this arbitrary one-third calculation
utilized the Court.
There are two options available to remedy this situation.
The first is to simply vacate the $57,000 award of the lower
court and valuate the properties as of April 30, 1992 as was
done by the defendant.

Under this theory the subsequent sale is

irrelevant as is any subsequent construction costs of
development.
The second option is to remand this matter to the lower
court so that Defendant may produce evidence as to the liability
which was incurred in order to sell this house at the $172,000
purchase price.

If for example, Defendant shows an additional

$55,000 was expended in order to make the house marketable, then
Plaintiff would be entitled to an asset value of $12,000 which
would be the difference between the sales price and the actual
cost of construction-

Defendant would have no objection to

including any profit as an asset as long as he has had the
opportunity to produce evidence of actual cost liabilities to
offset the sales price that was received as the asset.
Under either option, however, this Court should exercise
its appellate authority and require an adjustment be made to
this clearly erroneous calculation made by the lower court,
POINT IV
ALTHOUGH THE COURT ORDERED DEFENDANT
TO BE GIVEN A CREDIT OF $4,300 FOR
PLAINTIFF'S SALE OF THE FAMILY BOAT,
NO SUCH CREDIT WAS EVER GIVEN IN THE
ACTUAL ACCOUNTING.
During the course of the marriage, the parties purchased a
boat which they used for recreational purposes.

After the

separation Plaintiff took possession of the boat and ultimately
sold it to meet family needs.

The Court found that the

plaintiff received $4,300 from the sale of the boat and also
found this to be the best value to be attributed to it,

(Tr.

496-97) .
The Court gave the parties two options as to how to handle
this credit.

Either Plaintiff could be charged with a liability

of $4 ; 300 as to the marital accounting or, Defendant could
subtract $4,300 from the amount that he was obligated to pay
Plaintiff in order to avoid contempt of court.

(Tr. 503-05).

In fact, however, Defendant paid the full amount of support

arrearage with no deduction for the boat but did not receive any
credit for the boat in the marital accounting,

(See Schedule C

to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). For this reason,
therefore, an adjustment should be made in the equities now
owing between the parties.
CONCLUSION
This was a complex divorce case requiring tremendous effort
on the part of all involved*

The lower court did a commendable

job in sorting out the various claims and disputes.

The sheer

volume of problems being confronted may have allowed these few
to slip through the crack.
It is apparent that once the court determined that the
Kidder account was the separate property of Defendant, any use
of those funds after the divorce was final could not be deemed a
marital asset no matter what form the asset became.

This

wrongful inclusion requires appellate correction.
The failure to recognize the full amount of the Isabel
Coats note resulted from a perceived conflict in testimony.
With the present advantage of a trial transcript, it can be
readily seen that no conflict existed and that the preponderance
of evidence showed an obligation of $410,000.

This error too

requires correction.
The arbitrary award of $57,000 to Plaintiff as a result of
the Lot 16 sale cannot be sustained.

While Defendant

understands the frustration of the Court in dealing with Brandon
Canyon, there must nevertheless be some rationale in making
awards of assets.

Here, there was no logical reason to

arbitrarily take 1/3 of the sales price and award it to
Plaintiff-

A correction or remand is therefore required.

The $4,300 error as to the boat is minor, but still
requires an adjustment in order to meet the order of the Court,
Defendant asks this Court to grant the relief requested.
DATED this 12th day of June, 1993.
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